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Abstract 
This paper illustrates that emotions were considered a central component of juristic 
work in German legal thought around 1900, showing how emotional practices of 
judges were reshaped when they were confronted with new socio-political demands 
in the early 20th century. It argues that judicial emotions were intensely reflected 
upon and used by German jurists, especially via court rhetoric and specific politics of 
voice. It puts forward an understanding of vocal performances as emotional practices 
that became particularly contested during the first decades of the 20th century. 
Whereas classical ideals of judicial conduct placed a premium on authority and 
distance in order to ensure objectivity, a psychologically informed and emotion-based 
interaction between judges and court attendees came to the fore: the use of rhetoric 
and the ability of showing, forming, and creating emotions gained relevance. The 
judge was not only to manage his own emotions, but was conceived of as an active 
engineer of emotions in court. 
Key words 
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Resumen 
El artículo ilustra cómo el pensamiento jurídico alemán de alrededor de 1900 
consideraba las emociones un componente central del trabajo judicial, y muestra 
cómo las prácticas emocionales de los jueces cambiaron a tenor de las nuevas 
demandas sociopolíticas de principios del siglo XX. Se argumenta que los juristas 
alemanes usaban intensamente las emociones judiciales. Se definen las actuaciones 
orales como prácticas emocionales que fueron especialmente contestadas en el siglo 
XX. Mientras los ideales clásicos sobre la conducta de los jueces ponían el acento en 
la autoridad y la distancia para garantizar la objetividad, después avanzó un modelo 
de interacción psicológicamente informada y basada en la emoción: el uso de la 
retórica y la capacidad de mostrar, formar y crear emociones ganó protagonismo. El 
juez ya no sólo gestionaba sus propias emociones, sino que se convirtió en un 
ingeniero activo de emociones en el juzgado.  
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1. Introduction 
The polemical criticism of judges as automatons of decision-making that have lost 
their souls and mechanically apply the law is – in historical as in contemporary 
accounts – just as well known as the fear that emotions and subjective evaluations 
might influence the judge’s work for the worse.1 At the same time, it is and has 
always been beyond question that judges, being human beings, do have emotions. 
In fact, it is exactly the quality of being human that has historically been linked to 
judicial emotions and that has resulted in a polarization: the sorrow of being too 
human or not human enough. Analyzing debates in jurisprudence in the German-
speaking countries around 1900, the actual core problem comes to the fore: The key 
question was whether jurists and judges should feel differently than the average 
person. As I argue in this paper, jurists’ capacity to navigate their emotions was 
viewed as a central component of juristic work at the turn of the century. The 
discussion revolved not around if, but how, when, and what jurists should feel, how 
they should show their feelings, and, above all, how they should use them. Ideas on 
a specifically juristic cultivation, display, and usage of emotions, however, underwent 
a significant change in the early twentieth century. 
My paper approaches this shift from the perspective of the history of emotions. After 
briefly explaining the basic theoretical assumptions of my research, I will trace the 
ways in which German legal scholars defined and evaluated emotions around 1900. 
I will then address how these concepts played out in legal practice and emotional 
practices in court. I argue that emotions were intensely reflected upon and used by 
German jurists, especially in court rhetoric and a specific politics of voice. Vocal 
performances, I claim, can be understood as emotional practices, and I will show how 
judges’ use of the voice became particularly contested in the context of fundamental 
socio-political changes in the early twentieth century. 
2. The History of Emotions as a History of Legal Feelings 
The basic assumption underlying this analysis is that emotions have a history. I claim 
that emotions are shaped by society and culture, and that depending on the 
historically specific understanding of what emotions are and how they work, the 
functions that are attributed to them in a society change. From this perspective, 
emotions are not understood as fixed “natural” states, but rather as being formed in 
interaction with culture. I assume that shifts in how emotions are expressed influence 
how we perceive and interpret them, and vice versa. Emotions are thus part of a 
social practice that must be learned, trained, and performed (Rosenwein 2010, 
Plamper 2010, 2015, Scheer 2012). This is not to claim that feelings lack a bodily 
basis or are independent of physical processes. Rather, this approach seeks to 
account for the interplay between biological factors and cultural formation. How to 
measure this relationship exactly, and how to define emotions in general, is the 
subject of complex scientific debates that go beyond the limits of this essay (for an 
overview see Plamper 2015 as well as Boddice 2018). What is central for me, 
however, is the assumption that emotions are more than physical reflexes and cannot 
be adequately captured in universal categories. My criteria for determining what 
counts as an emotion is what in a society at a certain time is considered an emotion 
and perceived as such. In order to make sense of certain states and interpret them 
as emotions, societies need a concept that makes this interpretation possible in the 
first place. It is exactly these variable descriptions and conceptions of emotions, I 
argue, that determine the norms of what, how, where, and when we feel. Emotions 
are thus part of a constant process of negotiation about their meaning, 
appropriateness, and articulation. 
                                                 
1 See, for the German context, Ogorek 1986. For recent debates see the discussion on the essays of 
Fischer 2016.  
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This also holds true for the role of emotions in law. In fact, this is an especially 
interesting field as, according to the classical Western narrative, emotions are usually 
supposed to be entirely bracketed in jurisprudence. The law is, according to the ideal, 
a sphere of rationality that deals with cognitive, rule-based processes of applying 
norms. This combination of law or decision-making and rationality can be understood 
as a “cultural script” that is rooted in the long philosophical tradition of treating 
cognition and emotion as polar opposites (Maroney 2011). Alternative 
interpretations, particularly those that interweaved reason and emotion, have often 
been overlooked in the reception of legal philosophy. In recent years, however, the 
literature on the history of law and emotion has been growing, particularly with focus 
on the UK and the USA but also on Europe.2 Yet, due to differences in legal traditions 
– Germany being bound to civil law in contrast to Anglo-American case law to name 
one – national specificities need to be addressed. This paper contributes to the field 
in highlighting the German speaking countries that significantly influenced European 
and even American legal thought in the early twentieth century, showing how debates 
on juristic emotions are intertwined with broader socio-political questions of the time. 
3. How Judges Learned to Feel: Emotion Knowledge and “Rechtsgefühl” 
around 1900 
At first it might seem surprising that German jurisprudence dealt intensively with 
questions of emotions at the turn of the twentieth century. Yet, the relationship 
between law and emotion, and specifically that between judgment and emotion, was 
often discussed, igniting a controversy over legal methods that legal scholars of the 
time perceived as of nothing less than existential significance (Gängel and Mollnau 
1992b, Wilhelm 2010, pp. 323-409, 625). From this perspective, it becomes evident 
that the narrative of juristic rationality was accompanied by an equally widespread 
narrative of juristic emotionality that gained a new social urgency around 1900. As I 
argued elsewhere, the period between 1870 and 1933 marked a turning point in 
which the status of emotions in law was renegotiated.3   
To map out how jurists defined emotions and how this in turn informed ideas on legal 
practice, it is worth a close analysis of one emotion in particular: the “Rechtsgefühl”, 
a composite of the German words for law and emotion. Debates on this emotion and 
especially on the question whether it was to be counted as an emotion at all fueled 
the juristic controversies around 1900. The concept of Rechtsgefühl gives an 
excellent example of how knowledge about emotions shifted, both in terms of 
definitions or “emotional lexicons” (Frevert et al. 2014) as well as in terms of the 
practices associated with them. In particular, it illustrates just how many-sided and 
often confusingly variable ideas about emotions could be. Rechtsgefühl had a broad 
range of meanings: Closely connected to notions of (righteous) anger and sympathy 
it was often understood as a specific mix or a condensation of these emotions – an 
emotion based on a specific balance. At the same time it could denote a sense of 
justice or a juristic intuition. This complexity was due to the fact that the term 
“Gefühl” originally referred to the tactile sense and was only later used to describe 
an inner sense, inner movements or emotions. Accordingly, the term “Rechtsgefühl” 
did not clearly distinguish between sense, feeling or emotion but oscillated between 
these concepts. It was at the turn to the twentieth century that this openness was 
conceived as problematic for the first time. The Rechtsgefühl was discussed in 
contemporaneous legal theory and philosophy, cultural magazines, psychological, 
and physiological studies, but also in the context of court practice. 
The constant recurrence that both scholars of law and their colleagues in other 
disciplines made to the Rechtsgefühl and concepts of feeling conveys well the fact 
                                                 
2 For the eighteenth century, see Seymour 2012, Köhler and Schmidt 2015, Milka and Lemmings 2017. 
For recent research on the History of Law and Emotions see Kesper-Biermann and Ellerbrock 2015, 
Rozenblatt 2017, Kounine and Vidor 2017. 
3 For a more thorough analysis see my German monograph (forthcoming in 2019) with Wallstein.  
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that emotions were regarded as constitutive for the law at the turn of the century. 
Following philosophical traditions of the nineteenth century, emotions and feelings 
held functions that were seen as crucial for the development of law and society. As 
an “inner sense” that expresses itself through emotional reactions, the Rechtsgefühl 
in particular was considered an important element of legal life. The significance 
invested in it illustrates how emotions fulfilled a social function, as Rechtsgefühl 
served to legitimize the law, the legal practice, and jurists themselves. With their 
capacity to feel the law, jurists and especially judges of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century secured their social and professional status and gave proof of its 
necessity. An educated Rechtsgefühl was widely understood as the result of the 
jurist’s special ability to “correctly” balance emotion and reason and cultivate certain 
emotions like love and empathy (Rümelin 1871/1948). In practicing this ability, they 
marked themselves as possessing a skill that was – at least among most jurists – 
understood as specifically male and bourgeois. While the notion of Rechtsgefühl 
around 1900 also referred to emotions of non-legal scholars, this paper focuses on 
the implications it had for judges. The idea of a specifically trained judicial 
emotionality, it shows, also shaped ideas about certain emotional practices. By 
discussing different understandings of Rechtsgefühl, jurists equally discussed judicial 
emotional styles. The controversies reflect how jurists were expected to acquire, 
apply and display their Rechtsgefühl while at the same time conveying a growing 
concern with the impact of emotions in court in general. 
4. Back to the Roots: The Sense of Justice and the Genesis of Law 
Initially, the philosophy of law was the place where the importance of emotions for 
the law was systematically discussed: How is law to be defined? Where are its origins 
to be found? These were the basic questions of the field. Beginning in the 1870s, a 
debate on the role of Rechtsgefühl emerged. It questioned whether there existed 
anything like an innate sense of justice that informed our emotions and that – if 
trained and read correctly – might serve as an ethical guideline for the development 
and application of law. Building on influential German philosophers of the eighteenth 
century like Johann Gottfried Herder, the widespread claim persisted that the law 
was not an invention of jurists, but that it arose from a human drive and had its home 
in man’s heart as an innate instinct.4 This concept of legal feelings, which found its 
way into the German language as “Rechtsgefühl” around 1800, was part of an 
anthropological explanation of law that followed out of the old tradition of natural law 
(for the tradition of the 18th century see Köhler and Schmidt 2015). 
Thus, the notion that people had a sense or a drive for justice was not new at all. 
What was new, however, was contemporaneous scholars’ interest in the function of 
emotions. Legal feelings were now being interpreted in the context of psychological 
models, giving them a new scientific force.5 This seemed urgently necessary at the 
time: The flourishing school of legal positivism, which defined law strictly in terms of 
written statute, had gained dominance in legal discourse and challenged those who 
believed that the genesis of law was to be found in a sense of justice (Gängel and 
Mollnau 1992a). Thus, the reevaluations and detailed analyses of the Rechtsgefühl 
addressed a shift in legal thought, emerging at a time when popular encyclopedias 
had declared ideas of natural law obsolete. The numerous reflections on the sense of 
justice around 1900, however, reveal how persistent the idea of a law supposedly 
anchored in man proved to be.  
What made the concept of Rechtsgefühl so attractive was its ability to explain the 
driving forces behind the genesis of law that had long been vaguely described as 
“dark functions” of the soul. It allowed jurists to integrate new scientific approaches 
                                                 
4 Most influential for this debate were the writings of Gustav Rümelin (1871/1948) and Rudolf von Jhering 
(1897).  
5 This was already true of Rümelin’s and von Jhering’s texts and reached a new level of intensity in studies 
by Sigmund Kornfeld (1914, 1917) and Erwin Riezler (1921). 
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into older concepts of legal feelings. In line with the still young experimental natural 
sciences that had been established in the second half of the nineteenth century, legal 
feelings were now defined using the methods of psychology and physiology: Instead 
of “driving forces”, cycles of “energy”, strength of “nerves”, and “will power” now 
provided the primary explanations of what emotions were. Rechtsgefühl was 
measured by muscular activity and blood pressure, with stunning findings and claims 
about the connection between heart muscle activity and moral sentiments (Knapp 
1857, pp. 88-129, 144-246, Stricker 1884, Treiber 1998, pp. 177-186). The 
conception of emotions as inner senses and rational perceptions of the world gave 
way to an understanding of emotions as measurable bodily processes. The concept 
of Rechtsgefühl, however, made it possible to combine these new ideas with older 
traditions – and therefore remained a central, yet highly debated element of legal 
thought. 
5. Juristic Work as Emotional Work? Judges, Judgments and the Search for 
Scientificity 
These concepts of legal feelings also helped shape and legitimize ideas of juristic 
scientificity – not only relevant to academic scholars, they were also helpful for 
practitioners and all representatives of the German law, considering that they all 
underwent the same basic academic training at university.  
In line with the narrative about the genesis of law in feelings, German legal theory 
of the nineteenth century obliged jurists to establish and retain a connection to the 
collective sense of justice. Following the influential legal theory of Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny, each instantiation of law and custom was considered to have developed 
historically in particular linguistic and cultural communities and as “living” in a 
people’s spirit, the “Volksgeist”. Legal feelings were accordingly seen as collective 
feelings that united a legal community. Thus, feeling the law in a professional manner 
guaranteed that jurists would establish and retain connection to this collective sense 
of justice. Scholars elucidated the necessity of jurisprudence by claiming that shared 
legal feelings had to be implemented in systematic law. The Rechtsgefühl was 
regarded as the irreplaceable instrument of the legal scholar, whose work was based 
on the perception and translation of an unwritten law into a scientific system (on 
Savigny see Rückert 1984, pp. 234-241, Lahusen 2013, pp. 57-73).  
When emotions at the turn of the twentieth century were less and less defined in an 
epistemological way as reasonable, world-opening functions and as “inner senses”, 
but as bodily functions and expressions of the will (see Jensen and Morat 2008), 
feeling the law was increasingly considered problematic, because it was now seen as 
colliding with standards of scientific objectivity. Jurists demanded a more 
comprehensive form of emotional control in their day-to-day practice. The harshly 
led arguments on the question as to whether Rechtsgefühl was a practical sense or 
intuition based on embodied technical knowledge or whether it referred to emotions 
and subjective elements of the psyche that required constantly to be kept in check 
reflect the fact that the particular concept of Rechtsgefühl was key to its varying 
evaluation in legal practice. 
A new and heatedly debated position on this matter was put forth by the German 
Free Law Movement in the early twentieth century. Its proponents, among them legal 
scholars like Hermann Kantorowicz and Ernst Fuchs, argued that jurists should more 
strongly acknowledge legal feelings in the application of law and that scholars should 
make the Rechtsgefühl itself an object of research. Drawing on the emerging field of 
sociology, their aim was to undertake an empirical, “sociological” analysis of legal 
feelings in order to shed new light on processes of legal reasoning and turn emotions 
into productive forces for judicial decision-making (Gnaeus Flavius [Kantorowicz] 
1906, Fuchs 1908/1965). By taking a systematic approach to legal feelings, the Free 
Law Movement tried to reconnect the ideal of emotion-based legal work with the ideal 
of scientific objectivity. The vehement critique that the Free Law Movement 
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encountered, though, was not only due to the flaws and challenges of its 
methodology, which, according to critics, did not even deserve to be called one. It 
also reflects the shift in perspective on legal feelings ushered in by the Free Law 
Movement: For decades, the debates on Rechtsgefühl had primarily revolved around 
the genesis of law and its scientific development. Now, the discussion about law and 
emotions was transferred from legal philosophy into legal methodology and, with 
that, from the question of the genesis of law to that of the genesis of professional 
judicial decision-making. Judicial emotions took on a heretofore unheard-of 
sociopolitical relevance, as they were not only discussed in critical accounts of juries 
and lay judges, but also in relation to professional judges.  
Long-cultivated narratives about legal work that embraced feeling the law or the 
creative application of law received a new political impetus during the first decades 
of the twentieth century. With the rise of the social democratic movement and 
growing political tensions in the German Empire and especially in the politically 
polarized society of the Weimar Republic after the First World War, jurists showed an 
increased awareness of the emotional aspects of judicial judgments (Blackbourn 
2003, pp. 265–347, further: Grunwald 2012 and Hett 2014). But scholars differed in 
their definitions of the problem: While many jurists claimed that judicial emotions 
were given too much room, a growing number of jurists believed that, on the 
contrary, emotions were paid too little attention, which made them dangerous. Free 
Law jurists in particular claimed that fair judgments were only possible if judges were 
aware of the feelings that led them to resolve a case in a particular way and only if 
they explored the emotional underpinnings of their attitudes in order to then make 
them productive for legal reasoning. But more moderate colleagues like the president 
of the Austrian Supreme Court, Joseph Unger, or the German Supreme Court Judge 
Adelbert Düringer, also acknowledged that their decisions were often if not mainly 
guided by emotions and intuition – by their Rechtsgefühl (Unger 1906, col. 786, 
Düringer 1909, p. 7, on the debates of the “Methodenstreit” see Gängel and Mollnau 
1992a). 
This debate on judicial emotions was part of a major dispute ignited at the turn of 
the century by massive public criticism of the German judiciary. Judges were accused 
of executing class justice from the bench and of being detached from real life – claims 
that came not only from outside, but also from inside the legal sphere itself (Gängel 
and Mollnau 1992b, Hett 2014, pp. 299-476, 504–510, 577-603). Many jurists – 
lawyers as well as judges – identified as the core of the problem legal practitioners’ 
insufficient emotional education and their suppressed or poorly developed 
Rechtsgefühl.  
Contrary to what one might assume, the key proponents of increasing appreciation 
for legal feelings were not jurists with conservative or right-wing political 
persuasions. In the first place, republican lawyers, often drawing on the ideas of the 
Free Law Movement, insisted on the methodical inclusion of judicial emotions in court 
practice. The allegations of detachment and class justice, they claimed, could only be 
confronted if judges changed their emotional attitudes (On polemics about the 
blindfolded justitia see Rosenblum 2015, with a focus on lawyers see Grunwald 
2012). This argument especially gained steam in the years following the 
establishment of the first German democracy with the foundation of the Weimar 
Republic. In the 1920s, the explicit goal of the newly established association of 
republican jurists was to cultivate “republican feelings” (Fuchs 1925/1926, p. 251). 
Thus, the reforms that jurists demanded at the time often relied on a reformation of 
judicial emotions. Emotions were not always considered a danger, but rather as a 
condition of forming a judgment. It is this line of thinking that would become most 
relevant in the judiciary of the time. 
At the turn of the century, jurists demanded in progressively more emphatic terms 
that their colleagues make productive use of emotions in legal practice. From this 
perspective, the call for a better educated Rechtsgefühl can be read as a form of 
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“emotional labor” (Hochschild 1983), where emotions are adapted to and formed by 
the requirements of a particular type of work. At the same time, I argue, these 
demands drew on forms of “emotion work” that the sociologist Arlie Hochschild has 
defined as forms of managing and modulating one’s own emotions in private contexts 
(for a more detailed argument see Schnädelbach 2015). The concept of Rechtsgefühl 
was especially influential because it spoke to both levels. It was considered a part of 
an emotional education that was to first take place in private relations and would 
then be professionalized in juristic contexts. This entanglement explains why the 
debates on judicial emotions were so explosive. As jurists around 1900 highlighted 
the need for their colleagues to cultivate their emotions in a particular fashion, they 
contested the idea that a good Rechtsgefühl came naturally with a certain social 
background and a legal degree. Proponents believed that a higher level of emotional 
self-awareness and scientifically based education was necessary. This idea was 
fostered by newly emerging scientific fields like experimental psychology that 
stressed the significance of emotions in social life and also offered new perspectives 
on their handling.  
Spreading in an increasingly politicized society and legal culture, these new takes on 
judicial Rechtsgefühl marked a starting point for a reevaluation of juristic methods 
and judicial conduct. As I will show in the following, the ideal judge was defined in a 
new way during the first decades of the twentieth century. Imagined as more than a 
manager of his own emotions, the ideal judge supposed to fill the role of an emotional 
engineer who was to shape, make use of, and interact with the emotions of those 
who came before him in court. Manager and engineer are analytical terms that I use 
to convey a shift of judicial emotional practices that were systematically conceived 
as tools for creating certain emotional settings in court.    
6. Court Settings: Staging Law and Staging Emotions 
The idea that court proceedings could or even should have an emotional effect on 
those involved has been part of legal thought for a long time and is still relevant 
today (see, for example, Legnaro and Aengenheister 1999 or Jung 2016). The court 
architecture of the German Empire, however, set new standards. Beginning in the 
1870s, so-called “palaces of justice” were erected in numerous cities of the newly 
united Empire, which far outshined the previous houses of justice both in terms of 
size and decor. The monumental buildings explicitly appealed to the sacral and 
imperial architecture of the time, with imposing staircases, halls, and cupolas. The 
architecture pronounced the power of law and created an emotional space that was 
already reflected upon by court attendees at the time (Landau 1982, Klemmer et al. 
1993, pp. 34-36, 89-111, Hett 2004, p. 16. For work on emotional spaces see 
Gammerl and Herrn 2015, Großmann and Nielsen 2018). 
The “size and force of the law, the victory of right over injustice” was architectonically 
expressed in these new buildings, contemporaries emphatically stated. “Light and air 
everywhere”, Franz Hoeniger (1906, pp. 15, 16), a German lawyer, praised the Berlin 
Court of Appeal in 1906. It was the emotional effect that struck him most: “The 
mighty feeling: ‘You are in a place of supreme royal jurisdiction here’”. 
Evoking this sense of majesty, authority, and sacred awe was exactly what the courts’ 
architects were aiming at. The staging of the law was akin to a staging of power and 
hierarchy, and the courtroom was part of this. The set up was structured by specific 
visual axes – the vanishing point was always the judge’s bench – and drew on the 
effect of height differences. The judge’s bench was elevated and positioned on a rug 
at the front of the hall. Huge portraits of German emperors decorated the walls 
behind the judges. In contrast, the defendant and the lawyer were on the same level 
with the public. One’s own place within the hierarchy of the court became not only 
visible here, but was also made physically perceptible by the use of several different 
types of seating, from the most simple wooden chairs to throne-like leather armchairs 
(Vismann 2011, pp. 32-33, Ortmann 2014, pp. 119-121). 
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These forms and rituals were central to court proceedings and constituted their 
performative dimension: The power of law was not merely staged by legal 
professionals in front of an audience, but was performed in an interactive play in 
which all court attendees were involved. Rituals borrowed from religious contexts 
created a certain emotional setting, even in places where simple buildings had to be 
used because no palaces of justice were available. Again and again, everyone in the 
room had to stand up, not only when the judges entered and when the verdict was 
pronounced, but also every time defendants, witnesses, or jurors were sworn in. The 
authority and dignity of the court had to be felt at every moment; solemnity and 
respectfulness were the ideal moods. Particularly important to this end was ensuring 
silence in the hall and avoiding hustle and bustle. Nothing seemed more detrimental 
to the court setting than an improper busyness, perhaps caused by a too rapid 
sequence of oaths, an “up and down, with a lot of noise” that would make a 
“ridiculous, degrading comedy” out of the court dramaturgy (Kanzleirath Jäger 1855, 
p. 10, Habermas 2008, pp. 181-183; for recent ethnographic accounts see Wulf 
2003). 
The presiding judge effectively served as the director of the dramaturgy:  
Only very slowly: when [the judge] straightens himself in his chair, whose backrest 
towers majestically above him, when he senses that the assessors sit just as quietly 
in their armchairs and have found the most comfortable position for their legs, when 
he has checked if a window needs to be closed, if the auditorium has filled up and if 
the messenger is on hand, when he has opened in the file the pinched page on which 
the decisive opening decision stands, – only then does the presiding judge raise his 
eyes to the accused, to see a little how he behaves, whether his posture is 
appropriate, and, in particular, his hand is not found in that trousers’ pocket that 
leads to so many conflicts, most recently to read vice, crime, or innocence out of that 
face. (Beradt 1909, p. 45) 
From the first minute of the trial on, judicial authority was to be established, 
thereafter determining the rhythm of the proceedings. However, the court 
proceedings not only served to put hierarchies on display, but also to consolidate 
them. Following the court rituals, all persons involved confirmed the hierarchy and 
took on their respective roles. These rules of rank also largely determined what could 
be emotionally expressed in court and by whom. Articulating emotions often meant 
risking a transgression. Accordingly, attorney Beradt (1909, p. 45) advised 
defendants and witnesses that they keep a check on their facial expressions and body 
language, such as to disdainfully raise one’s lips, speaking in a mannered way, or 
making gestures that showed disagreement or disrespect. How accepted or even 
expected displays of emotion were to be distinguished from transgressions was the 
object of a constant process of negotiation fought out between lawyers and judges 
in particular. 
During the proceedings, a key challenge for judges was to keep his own emotions in 
check and to find the right balance of emotional display in order to be able to claim 
a good Rechtsgefühl. A judge’s ability to create a court dramaturgy with the right 
emotional set up was often more important for his promotion to higher posts than 
was his professional knowledge. For example, in 1906 (GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 84a 
1900-1920, p. 186), Judge Bock was recommended for the post of district court 
director, even though his supervisor’s assessment stated that he was “not a 
particularly ingenious lawyer called to solve difficult legal issues”. The decisive factor 
was rather his “calm, resolute appearance”, paired with his “tact”, which he would 
find very useful in “leading hearings”. As I will illustrate, old topoi of judicial conduct 
were increasingly framed as practices of emotional communication and were reflected 
as part of juristic methodology that set up new standards for emotional self-reflection 
of judges. 
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7. The Voice is the Message: Court Rhetoric and Emotions 
But how did juristic reflections on emotions translate into practice? How were 
emotions actually communicated, performed, recognized, and interpreted in court? 
Following Monique Scheer (2012) I understand emotions as a kind of (social) practice 
that – as I argue here – was central to juristic practice around 1900. Some elements 
of emotional articulation have already been mentioned in the quote above: Gestures 
and facial expressions are often named in the sources, and historically have received 
much attention as markers of emotion. Less in the focus but equally prominent were 
specific modes of speaking. I propose to consider vocal articulation in court as an 
emotional practice through which emotions were performed and (re)produced. The 
voice, I argue, was the key medium for the articulation and interpretation of judicial 
emotions. Vocal performance was part of an emotional practice whose function and 
goals changed from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century – as well as the 
practices themselves. Whereas the nineteenth century tradition identified the 
creation of authority, majesty and awe as most relevant, jurists in the first decades 
of the twentieth century were supposed to establish an atmosphere of openness, 
sympathy and interaction. In both cases the modes in which judges were supposed 
to use their voice served to create a certain emotional space. They can be understood 
as emotional practices not only in their function of producing or fostering emotions 
in court but also in their relation to specific modes of juristic emotional self-
governance and emotional display. Politics of voice clearly marked to what extend 
and to what end emotional articulation was accepted. In accordance with new ideas 
on the functions and effects of emotions in court proceedings the ways of cultivating, 
handling, and modeling emotions changed. 
On a theoretical level the voice can be described as the “performative phenomenon 
par excellence”, that is characterized by a specific temporality and corporeality 
(Kolesch and Krämer 2006, p. 11). The meaning(s) the voice generates result out of 
personal interactions in a shared moment in a shared space, a point that is of 
considerable relevance for the legal sphere. Judicial performance was (and is) defined 
by acts of interrogation, listening, and speaking. Indeed, it is only through acts of 
communication that a “case” itself ever comes into being, a point that still holds true 
today. To raise his/her voice and to be heard was and is one of the fundamental 
rights that constitute the legal subject. This drew on the old idea that the voice was 
closely connected to a person’s soul and transported sincere expressions of emotion. 
As the German writer and jurist Martin Beradt (1909, p. 45) observed in 1909, every 
defendant impatiently awaited the first word of the judge:  
For a face can be disguised, and gestures are not always easy to read. But even in a 
voice so violent or annoying, there is something that tells us about the human being. 
Every defendant knows this with the instinct of his nerves tensed from the first 
moment, and that is why he waits with pain for the first word, a hope from every 
fuller vowel, a disappointment in every gawked consonant. 
This comment illuminates why the voice was understood as a key component of 
judicial emotional conduct. Law was performed in the medium of voice. The voice of 
the judge was understood as an active player in court proceedings, a point well 
conveyed by a scene described by Martin Beradt (1909, pp. 33-34):  
But now a voice leaps through the middle of the hall; suddenly, all of a sudden, it 
seems to have jumped off the Green Table [the judge’s bench], flying through the 
air, and started firing at someone. At whom? At the accused? (At this poor person? 
What does the raging voice want?) At the audience that is holding its breath (…)? No, 
this voice has jumped on the witness, on this gentle, even narrative (…). Now more 
violently (…), recurrently, it sits down on the throat of this man, struggling with every 
word that he brings out, pushes it back, if it is wrong, pulls it out, if he wants to hold 
it back.  
This judicial voice jumps, chases, fires. It is characterized by aggressiveness and a 
readiness to fight. The scene is one of a conflict between two voices, two bodies, in 
Sandra Schnädelbach   The voice is the message… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 9, n. 5 (2019), 616-635 
ISSN: 2079-5971 627 
which the hierarchy is clear from the very first moment. The judicial use of voice is 
not merely a preparatory element in the discovery of justice. It is a part of the 
decision-making process itself, as it investigates, evaluates, enforces, judges. The 
oral nature of the trial makes judging an “event in the language”, i.e. something that 
takes place in shared moments of speech acts (Vismann 2011, p. 113). 
These vocal performances posed a challenge to the presiding judge, as they forced 
him to take on a dual role. On the one hand, he had the power to regulate the speech 
of all those present, determining the “discourse economy” (Vismann 2011, p. 49). 
He decided on what was permitted to be voiced on the stage of the court and how. 
On the other hand, the judge had to represent, stage, and guarantee that the 
proceedings were open and unbiased, a balance that had to be created through 
speech acts. 
This use of voice in court is closely linked to the use of court rhetoric, which scholars 
have generally discussed in respect to its long-standing significance for lawyers (an 
exception is: Vasilyev 2017. For the French tradition of lawyers see Vidor 2017). The 
central position of the judicial voice in court, though, was met with particular interest 
in the early twentieth century. Jurists had a pronounced awareness of the 
dramaturgical challenges in the design of judicial speech acts. Court hearings were 
based on a politics of voice, which came under increasing critique at the turn of the 
twentieth century, providing an object of critical reflection for both legal theorists and 
practitioners. 
The debate over the politics of voice in the courtroom was part of a broader 
reassessment of the hierarchies, both social and professional, that defined the 
judiciary. Frequently, the conflicts that arose during court proceedings were caused 
by lapses in speech that were perceived as defamatory insults. Time and again, 
disciplinary measures taken against lawyers or judges in the early twentieth century 
revolved around an interpretation of the tone that had been used. Not only what, but 
above all how something was said, was decisive. A complaint against district court 
judge van Dühren in 1930 (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz – 
hereinafter GStA – PK, I. HA Rep. 84a 1928-1931) remained without consequences 
on the grounds that all those involved in the proceedings confirmed that the judge’s 
statement about the applicant being “rather stubborn” had been expressed in a 
friendly tone. The crucial point was not whether he had really spoken in a friendly 
tone or not, but rather the conviction that underlies it: It was universally agreed upon 
that the judge’s style of speaking revealed his emotional attitude and that a correct 
use of voice was decisive for the evaluation of judicial conduct.   
In another case (GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 84a 1900-1924, pp. 11, 25), a lawyer named 
Halpert complained before the Major Disciplinary Senate in 1900 about a municipal 
court judge. Although the conflict was based upon a formal mistake of the judge, the 
lawyer was found responsible for escalating the situation. As the Disciplinary Senate’s 
decision stated:  
Dr. Halpert was incensed and engaged in non-apologetic disorderly behavior, blaming 
the judge in a screaming tone, and even preparing to label his behavior impertinent. 
An attorney who forgets himself to this extent robs himself of his (…) right to 
treatment commensurate with the dignity of his profession and must accept that he 
(…) is asked to leave the room and in case of refusal is removed. 
At issue was thus not the judge’s formal mistake. What counted instead were 
questions of honor and dignity and the question of how their violation was to be 
expressed. While a formal written complaint about the judicial conduct would have 
been accepted, its emotional articulation in “a screamed tone” was not permitted, as 
it was considered an attack on judicial authority. For lawyers, successfully controlling 
their emotions was a prerequisite for being treated by the judge in a dignified 
manner.  
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How did jurists learn about the limits of emotional expression? From the nineteenth 
century on, the publication of manuals on juristic rhetoric, which also established 
norms of conduct, became a sort of cottage industry. The rules on how emotions 
were to be displayed were based on cultural conventions, which were already 
understood as such. These conventions were consciously wielded to distinguish 
German courts from their French neighbors, for example, who were considered too 
sensitive. Lawyers crying was seen as a typically French form of emotional excess. 
Those who could “only stammer with tears” would no longer be useful as defenders, 
a book on court rhetoric from the mid-nineteenth century noted. Even in restrained 
crying, however, the authors (Schall and Boger 1855, pp. 121, 122) recognized a 
danger:  
For us a weeping defender would be a most conspicuous apparition, which would 
under no circumstances bring happiness. A subdued voice, a moving tone, and some 
broken words are the expressions of inner movement which the court speaker is not 
allowed to exceed in our country, without hurting our sense of propriety. 
Inherited from the nineteenth century, the strictures placed on judges’ expressions 
of emotion were even tighter. Judges had to engage in a sensitive rhetorical balancing 
act, a venture fraught with pitfalls. “If only a single jocular expression, a single 
ridiculous phrase, a single ignoble word escapes his mouth”, Heinrich Brinkmann 
(1826, pp. 125-128) warned, “the judge falls out of his serious and dignified 
attitude”. In the choice of tone, therefore, the judge possessed “no freedom at all”: 
calmness and sincerity were to shape his speech in order to avoid “falling out of the 
right tone under any circumstances, however tempting they may be”. Following the 
ancient tradition of rhetoric, choice of vocabulary and conduct of voice went hand in 
hand in legal rhetoric as well. Speaking “passionately”, “exuberantly”, or even 
“vividly” was highly disapproved of, just as humor and laughter were considered 
unworthy of the dignity of the judge. Mastering the voice in order to prevent an 
unwitting exposure of one’s feelings was the central task and challenge. Court 
rhetoric was part of an emotional practice that aimed not only at certain displays of 
emotion (or at avoiding them) but was also based upon and actively shaped certain 
forms of judicial identity and self-relation. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, however, the criteria for what counted 
as successful judicial rhetoric changed. Even though guide books still referred to 
ideals such as objectivity and sobriety in order to support their broader arguments 
on how judges should manage their emotions, they now meant something different. 
Well-measured formality was out, while freshness and liveliness of speech were now 
counted among the most important values. These new norms were connected to 
broader developments in the legal sphere. The judicial politics of voice had become 
a choice object of contemporary criticism of the judiciary: Using the topos of an 
allegedly excessive legal formalism, the authors of manuals on court language and 
rhetoric joined the great chorus of those who complained about the judiciary’s lack 
of flexibility and emotional competence.6 
The Thuringian judge Richard Deinhardt (1910, pp. 68, 67, 73, similar Daubenspeck 
1893) identified judicial language as a central element of what he thought were 
urgently needed reforms of court practice. Judicial speech, he argued, should not be 
characterized by “comfortable tranquility”; rather, he believed that language should 
be “lively” and “educated by ear”. “The inner essence of justice”, so he claimed in 
1910, “must also appear in the outer form, in expression and language”. “What 
moves us in the innermost”, he wrote, should be made explicit. He thus advised that 
judges seek the “truest, most direct expression” instead of letting “the seriousness 
of the profession” freeze him. 
While lawyers were generally criticized for their excessively exaggerating their 
feelings, judges were usually criticized for their exaggerated matter-of-factness, even 
                                                 
6 On the critique against the judiciary, see Wilhelm 2010. 
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stiffness, which critics saw as determining their style of conducting court proceedings. 
This style, in turn, was considered an important factor in crisis of justice that was 
widely perceived in society. Beginning in the 1890s, the German judiciary had been 
confronted with harsh criticism about inappropriate verdicts, politically biased 
decisions, and an overall lack of sensitivity (Siemens 2005, Wilhelm 2010, p. 323, 
Rosenblum 2015). In the aftermath of the First World War and with intensifying 
economic and sociopolitical conflicts, the general dissatisfaction with the justice 
system even increased (Hett 2014). In this context, the use of the judicial voice came 
to be seen as a highly influential means of optimizing court practice. The judicial 
politics of voice now came under scrutiny with regard to the emotional messages 
they communicated. A new, critical reevaluation of hierarchy came to the fore and 
paved the way for a change of emotional practices in court. These practices 
concerned judicial self-perception as well as displays of emotion. They actually 
merged the personal and the professional or, rather, were built on the belief that 
emotional practices needed to be rooted in the private sphere to succeed in the 
professional one.  
8. From Emotion Managers to Engineers of Emotions 
The ideal of “spiritedness” that judges were often committed to was now increasingly 
rejected. Originating in the military sphere, this term referred to ideals of courage, 
determination, and “the habit of expressing oneself brightly and sharply” (Zacharias 
1911, p. 8). In the eyes of critical jurists, though, this ran counter to the actual 
demands of judicial work. According to Hamburg judge Adolf Nikolas Zacharias 
(1911, pp. 8-15), the incisiveness of the officer type might be fitting for the parade 
ground, but in the courtroom, it is “inhibiting, damaging and even destructive”. For 
Zacharias, the judge should be able to recognize the different “states of mind” of the 
people coming in front of court. His usage of tone and voice should take into account 
the exceptional situation in which they found themselves. The judge was supposed 
to assess the emotional state of the defendants, witnesses, and plaintiffs and tailor 
his choice of expression to them. The judge’s tone, Zacharias wrote, could exert a 
decisive influence on the course of the hearing. A certain tone of voice was demanded 
not just during the interrogation of “particularly sensitive personalities”; in court, he 
recognized, all people are seized by nervousness and concerns about making 
mistakes, which often led to “paralysis”. 
Highlighting these new politics of voice, jurists aimed at creating an atmosphere that 
might cushion the psychological pressure in court and allow the attendees to open 
up to the judge. “To break down barriers” was the goal that was to be guaranteed by 
the right judicial attitude. The task consisted judges letting the “inner person shine 
through” in their “outer nature and behavior”. The judge’s appearance, facial 
expressions, and speech were understood as key factors in improving their 
interactions with the respondents. Referring to contemporaneous psychological 
studies, Zacharias claimed that the person who “feels” the goodwill of the judge 
would have an easier time “thinking, remembering, and speaking”, thus facilitating 
the court’s aim of discovering the truth (Zacharias 1911, pp. 8-15). Thus, he advised 
judges to counteract the negative emotional effects of the court situation through the 
use of their own positive feelings. They were supposed to adopt an attitude of 
“emotional permeability” in order to develop a sensibility for the emotions of others, 
with the ultimate aim of influencing these emotions.  
In the early twentieth century, legal scholars and practitioners increasingly 
emphasized how important the correct judicial handling of emotions was for finding 
the truth. This was connected to the fact that traditional understandings of judicial 
authority were becoming discredited. Jurists saw the causes for the crisis of justice 
in structural and methodological shortcomings of the legal system, but pointed to a 
core problem as well: The inadequate emotional training of the judiciary. In this 
regard, jurists went along with the press, which had found a favorite topic in 
lambasting the emotional shortcomings within legal practice; indeed, its open 
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criticisms encountered serious resistance from judges (Hett 2014). Reform-oriented, 
left-liberal jurists, however, strove to make a new emotional attitude the standard in 
the judiciary: They wanted to replace mechanisms of social distinction from lower 
classes that were common in bourgeois circles (to which judges belonged) with 
emotional openness. To reestablish trust in the judiciary, reformers claimed, an 
emotional bond was necessary that could only be established through a mutual 
knowledge of life circumstances, ways of speaking, and values (On the reform 
discourse see Siemens 2005, Wilhelm 2010).  
These accounts of opening-up were supported by the findings of contemporary 
criminal psychology (Gross 1905, pp. 16-49), which reaffirmed the need for judges 
to engage in more reflection on how they managed their emotions: Only if the judge 
succeeded in creating a benevolent atmosphere by cultivating positive emotions 
through voice and gestures could similar emotions be evoked in defendants and 
witnesses. Producing fear, nervousness, and pressure in court would only serve to 
negatively affect the memory and speech of defendants and others and thus have a 
negative impact on the court’s ability to find the truth. Emotional practices in court 
were now reflected as such and methodologically reevaluated. 
In the early twentieth century, the discipline of criminal psychology was on its rise. 
A key figure in the field in Germany was criminal law professor, former prosecutor, 
and investigating judge Hans Gross. In his influential manual for judges from 1905 
(Gross 1905, pp. 55, 56), he identified a connection between the “timbres” of the 
voice and emotional states. Drawing on Charles Darwin, he wrote: “A person who 
quietly complains of bad treatment, or suffers insignificantly, almost always speaks 
in a high tone. Deep groaning, or high piercing screaming shows extreme pain”. 
Concerning court practice, Gross attempted to decipher the meanings of the “half-
high tone” of voice (“questioning, uncertain”), the “mysterious tone” (“querulous 
person”), and “hoarse and halting” speech (“the really deeply hurt”). 
This criminalistic knowledge was framed as something that could help judges 
interpret statements. But beyond that, it was also supposed to serve as a practical 
guide that might teach them to train their own style of speaking. According to Gross 
(1905, pp. 16–19, 198), an open, attentive, vivacious judicial attitude would ensure 
that the parties involved in the trial were “infected” with it. These claims transferred 
themes of classical rhetoric into a psychological frame of interpretation and placed a 
new emphasis on the judge. Liveliness and interest of the judge were to ensure the 
“right (…) psychological treatment” of those involved. A judge should, Gross stated, 
act as “psychologist”. He pitched the emotional conduct of the judge as a 
methodological element of criminal psychology. According to him, the judge had the 
task of “educating” the interviewees on how to be “good witnesses”, which he thought 
could be achieved by transferring one’s own emotional openness to the other person. 
In contemporary terms (Zacharias 1911, p. 61), the judge was a psychologist, 
educator, and even a “therapist”. His job was not only to mold his own emotions, but 
also to have a productive influence on those of others. He appeared not only as a 
manager, but also as an engineer of emotions. Whereas classical ideals of judicial 
conduct placed a premium on keeping distance in order to ensure objectivity, the 
psychologically informed, emotion-based interaction between judges and court 
attendees that came to the fore during the first decades of the twentieth century held 
that showing, forming, and creating emotions were crucial acts in the courtroom 
setting. Classically attributed to lawyers, they now took on increasing relevance for 
the men in black robes.  
In the last decades of the German Empire and even more strongly in the politically 
divided society of the Weimar Republic, liberal jurists and the public came, for the 
first time, to grasp the social functions of law. The polemic against the symbol of the 
blindfold of Justitia that arose during the Weimar Republic is telling here: the 
blindness of Justitia no longer stood for securing objectivity and a judiciary 
uninfluenced by social and political concerns, but was increasingly associated with 
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ignorance and cold-heartedness. The concern that Justitia’s blindness could be read 
as a lack of empathy was so great that the Ministry of Justice eventually decided not 
to use blindfolds in future depictions of her (Rosenblum 2015). 
This reaction was closely linked to the widespread accusations that German judges 
“hid” from their feelings or “cut them off”: “The suffering he inflicts leaves him no 
sting, he feels no pain”, Martin Beradt (1930, p. 12) wrote in a critique of the 
judiciary. Court reporters like the well-known journalist Paul Schlesinger (Sling 1929, 
2013a, pp. 363, 361) emphasized the internal psychological turmoil involved in 
developing a judgment as an important aspect of judging as well and, following an 
old topos, placed it in opposition to the emotionless administration of law. A judge 
who only administers the law “will often silence his heart”, Schlesinger noted in the 
1920s, identifying this approach as a cause of the ongoing crisis of justice. In 
contrast, Schlesinger held that judges had to expose themselves to the suffering 
brought into the courtroom. But the “official” type of judge, Schlesinger continued, 
sits “rosy, correct, and decorative” at his table. “His cool, straight attitude makes it 
impossible for any excesses to occur before his chair”, and “when judging, he calmly 
looks for a middle course, and he finds it without an inner struggle becoming visible 
(…). The verdict flows coolly from his lips”. 
Schlesinger understood the capacity to feel and show compassion as a necessary part 
of the judge’s toolbox. On the one hand, this would help the judge better understand 
the complexities of the individuals before him. On the other hand, and this was the 
novelty of his thought, he also believed that this capacity should allow the judge to 
compensate for the limits of the judiciary and the imperfections of the law itself. By 
dismissing the “pinch of correctness”, Schlesinger (Sling 2013b, p. 21) hoped, the 
judge would be able to compensate for the fallibility of judicial practice. “There is no 
objectivity. Neither in science nor at the judge’s bench. Even the photographic lens 
is not objective. Helmholtz said he would send the human eye back to the optician if 
he had ordered it from him – so flawed was its construction. We all live from 
conventions: visual, acoustic, emotional.” 
With these words, Schlesinger not only called into question the norms of legal 
objectivity. He also stated clearly what he thought constituted the crucial factor of 
legal judgment: namely, conventions of feeling. Emotions, contemporaries believed, 
were constitutive of the law at the turn of the twentieth century. Although the Weimar 
Republic is often seen through the lens of what followed it, the examples here 
demonstrate well that, the attempt to forge a strong relation between law and 
emotions cannot be attributed to one specific political or ideological conviction, but 
was propagated by diverse camps from the right as well as the left. In the end, the 
vision of an emotionally informed justice as conceived of by Schlesinger was not able 
to escape the perversion of justice that followed.  
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